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ABSTRACT
THE POLITICAL PREFERENCES OF THE ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT:
PARTISAN OR NON-PARTISAN
Richard Edward Connors III, M.A.
Department of Political Science
Northern Illinois University, 2015
Matthew Streb, Director
This thesis examines the political preferences of the Illinois Supreme Court through
different high court voter tendencies. Justices were analyzed to see if they relied on aspects
outside of the court of law when making their rulings. Two different court periods were viewed
in order to get an overall make-up of the court over the past two decades. Justices rulings were
placed in a voter bloc to try and determine if certain judges voted along side party lines with
those from the same political party. If so, the analysis can show that certain justices rely on
more than law and precedent when making there perspective case rulings.
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INTRODUCTION

Several models have been developed over time to predict the capacity at which
American Judges make their rulings. The theory of judicial precedent teaches that the justices
of our courts rely strictly on law and precedent set forth before them in order to make their
rulings. They are considered to have gone though similar law education that is the building
block to their knowledge of the American legal system. Judges should rely on precedent while
on the bench; they are expected to uphold the laws of a particular city, county, or state with the
utmost integrity. But how do judges go about ruling on the cases that impact so many lives?
Court justices are entrusted to be neutral, value-free referees in the court of law when they
make rulings. They should rely on precedent and their training as law practitioners when it
comes to handing down verdicts.
But what happens when external factors impact the way they rule on cases? Certain
states elect judges to their courts through partisan elections. This introduces two different
theoretical perspectives within a given judicial system. The theory of attitudes argues that some
justices bring their personal ideologies into the court with them when making their rulings. This
is typically associated with judicial elections as certain justices can then run with a given party
label attached to their name. This allows voters the ability to use certain heuristics to take
mental short cuts when they notice an “R” or “D” next to a potential justice’s name. In states
with partisan elections, do their judges rely on their party preferences more often than not when
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making their rulings? After all, the candidate’s party affiliation may have helped secure his or
her seat on the bench. Would a justice feel obligated to rule more with his or her partisan
leaning than the training in law that they have been socialized into for much of their
professional career? If so, the theory of strategy is employed, and with that comes the judges’
ability to construe their rulings in order to favor those attitudes of those who elected them to the
bench. The theory of strategy considers each member as a rational actor with the goal of getting
re-elected. There is no better way to get re-elected than to rule to appease those who elected the
individual in the first place. These questions are constantly asked in the discipline of political
science (Segal, Spaeth 1993).
This phenomenon is fascinating given that if one were to ask a high-ranking justice
whether their attitudes affect their rulings, there is no telling what sort of answer one would
receive. This is not to say that all justices allow their political tendencies to influence their
judgment; many clearly take law into account when ruling each and every case. Some cases,
though, require one to use something more than law and precedent. They must make decisions
for themselves, and their own policy preferences may come into play.
One such state that elects its Supreme Court justices through partisan elections is
Illinois. The Illinois Supreme Court is a seven-member court that currently is made up of four
Democrats and three Republicans. Members are elected from five pre-determined electoral
districts, with Chicago electing three members to the bench. The justices are elected to ten-year
terms with the option to run for an additional term in a non-partisan retention election. Here, a
ballot simply reads “yes” or “no” for that candidate and he or she must get at least 60%
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approval to be retained. The partisan aspect of these elections can be a key factor in all districts
across the state.
Political parties are extremely active in partisan races for judgeships across the U.S.;
Illinois is no exception. In the 2004 election between Lloyd Karmeier and Gordon Maag, the
two combined spent roughly 10 million dollars on the campaign, much of which was financed
from the major political parties (Streb, 2007). With all of this influence in the Illinois election,
it would come as no surprise to find that the justices rely on these parties and their particular
positions in making their decisions on a daily basis. Due to the inherent nature of elections for
the Illinois Supreme Court and the political party involvement that surrounds the institution, I
expect to find that the justices of the court employ a strategic decision making strategy when
making key decisions. Research shows that judges who gain access to the bench through
elections are typically like-minded, whereas in the appointment process they are more spread
out ideologically (Boyea, 2007). This directly contradicts what I expect to find in Illinois,
Illinois is expected to be different due to the vast difference of political ideology throughout the
state. The split of the court is four to three in favor of the Democrats, and due to this makeup it
makes sense to presume that on certain cases the Democrats will band together to pass rulings
in favor of their preferences. I do not expect to find a drastic difference between the two
parties’ rulings, as many cases return a unanimous decision. The thesis will proceed as follows.
I will give insight to relevant research already produced in regard to the attitudinal model in
relation to court justices. Accompanying this will be a brief oversight of other theories of how
justices make their rulings, such as the theory of precedent and the theory of strategy.
Following will include a brief synopsis of the current culture of judicial partisan elections in the
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U.S. today. There is no doubt that political actors are trying to gain a foothold in the
courtrooms across the nation. Some information on the matter can give insight toward the
current electoral scenery that an Illinois Supreme Court Justice would experience. The
proceeding section will discuss the methods I employed to uncover my data, including a sixyear total analysis from two different decades. Following the methods will be my data set and
the underlying assumptions I drew based off of what I uncovered. When looking at the results
of each Illinois Supreme Court at a glance, one can tell that the court behaves in a nonpartisan
fashion. Given the nature of the findings, further research would prove vital. Lastly, I ask any
further questions that could be answered from further research in regard to different state
supreme courts abroad.

THEORIES

There are three lines of thinking that have been debated for years over how Judges
make their rulings. Precedent, attitudes, and strategic acting by the Judges are three that are
contested in Political Science. It is extremely possible that one could view each line of thinking
in a single court setting. All three come with varying hypotheses that have the ability to place
different notions upon judicial behavior. One could argue that all three also have their place
within the Illinois Supreme Court; different cases give each line of thinking some form of
credibility. However, given the circumstances surrounding the court, the strategic line of
thinking is what is viewed within Illinois. Judges feel the need to make strategic rulings in
order to gain re-election when their initial term is up. Coming from a politically divided state
such as Illinois, certain Justices would feel the need to appease their constituency come reelection time in order to keep their place on the bench (Atkins 1972; Murphy 1964; Rohde and
Spaeth 1976). Before justifying the hypothesis as to why the strategic line of thinking works for
Illinois, the model of attitudes, as well as precedent, will be explored in order to understand
why they are not predicted to be the models viewed within the Illinois Supreme Court.
The model of attitudes has been a prominent theory of judicial behavior for some time
in political science (Pritchett 1948). The theory alleges that when confronted with difficult
decisions upon the bench, certain justices will rely on their personal attitudes and preferences in
order to make their rulings. For Illinois, it is assumed that when confronted with a difficult case
where there is lack of precedent, the justices will have the ability to rely on their own personal
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attitudes, acquired through different means of political socialization, when determining the
outcome of such case. To better understand this, each part of the theory will be broken down
farther. The initial premise of ruling on personal attitudes comes from several prominent
scholars of political science (Segal and Spaeth 1993; Schubert 1958; Adamany 1969). Their
main data was initiated at the Supreme Court of the United States and eventually made its way
down to several state Supreme Courts. The idea is that when confronted with a difficult
decision, or in the general manner of a particular judge, instead of using precedent set forth
prior, they will utilize their political ideologies when ruling on such cases (Segal and Spaeth
1993). These ideologies are typically derived through the course of their life and career
(Campbell, Converse and Miller 1960). There is much more political thought put into this
method than others as it relies on one thinking for what they ideologically believe in.
The second part of the theory deals with how an individual gains their political
ideology. Here, the Michigan model is adopted for Illinois, as various avenues throughout their
careers will have politically socialized (Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes 1960). Being
state Supreme Court justices, each member has undergone several experiences to shape and
mold their political thought. This can be their education, experiences as a lower court judge,
and even how and where the individual grew up. Each Justice comes from a different area of
Illinois, which represent different ideologies derived throughout the state (Martin 1984). It’s
expected to see more partisan involvement in states that utilize partisan elections, such as that
of Illinois, although this is not to say that it does not occur in non-partisan elections (Streb
2007). The Illinois Supreme Court Justices are set up to utilize their personal preferences. With
that being said, I do not believe that the model of attitudes is the theory to be viewed in Illinois.
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It is hypothesized that the theory of strategy will be viewed over the model of attitudes for
several reasons dealing with State Supreme Court politics and elections.
The theory involved with judicial thinking is the model of precedent. If this model were
to be assumed, the justices in several courts would utilize their education and experience in
previous cases to rule strictly on precedent set forth by previous court rulings (Allen 1991). In
looking into this model, it is assumed that the only factors being considered are those that are
constructed in other court rulings (Friedman 2006). Precedent is the earlier action or example
that is set forth to guide future action. For all intents and purposes of courtroom analysis, a
Supreme Court Justice in Illinois would utilize prior decisions on the given case of appeals or
other decisions similar to that case in order to construct their rulings. Their opinions are littered
with notions of other court rulings to back up the decisions that each justice came to in
regarding that certain case.
When using the theory of precedent, no other outside factors are considered to penetrate
the courtroom; however, considerations may be made to justify what society is asking for or
willing to accept (Hansford and Spriggs 2006). Although, major ideologies and attitudes appear
to be of no influence when the justices make their rulings. During this theory, the judges are
considered to be complete neutral actors in the judicial system as none of their previous bias
impacts the decisions being made (Friedman 2006). Judges are often criticized that this model
is no longer in use due to their inherent ideologies. This model was not predicted due to the
way that Illinois elects their justices through partisan methods, which can add a major political
element to the judicial system. Attitudinal scholars constantly attack this model as more and
more research are delivered in favor of the model of attitudes and strategy. Because Illinois is a

8
state that puts emphasis on the partisan elections, I did not hypothesize that the theory of
precedent would be linked to the Illinois Supreme Court.
The third and final model discussed regarding judicial thinking is the theory of strategy.
This is essentially construing a justice’s ruling to appease those who place them into their
position (Murphy 1964). Majority justices are very similar in their background prior to being
elected. They have law degrees and have typically prosecuted and defended cases before
putting on the robe (Canon 1972; Watson and Downing 1969). New research shows that judges
in election states face more factors that can limit their career than those in states with
appointment elections (Boyea, 2011). This would make one think that in order to get re-elected,
a justice may strategically vote in order to re-gain their position upon the bench. Justices tend
to construe their votes more in line with those who put them on the bench once a re-election is
coming up. By acting strategically, a justice can help their chances of being positively viewed
by the electorate, and thus help him or herself in re-election (Elling 1982; Thomas 1984;
Kuklinski 1978). For that reason, my hypothesis for the thesis revolves around the theory of
strategy as it applies to those mainly in districts of competitive elections; a person may
construct their rulings to appease the interests of the given electorate. By doing so around
retention time, a justice could prolong their career by appeasing to the electorate (Boyea, 2011).
This is the theory that is hypothesized to be viewed in the interworking of the Illinois Supreme
Court. This is mainly attributed to the very separate electoral districts and partisan elections.
Chicago has been fairly liberal over the past decade or so, with the remaining parts of the state
favoring the conservative ideology (Cohen 2012). It would make sense that if a justice wanted
to run and be successful in Chicago they would show they vote in correspondence with the
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liberal agenda. Whereas in the rest of the state, an individual would want to construe their
rulings to favor conservatism in order to appease those whom elected him or her. With an
increased amount of pressure coming from the political parties around Illinois, elections are
becoming much more political than they were in the past (Streb 2007).
A majority of justices would, no doubt, take into account law and precedent; it’s in their
education and background to consider all factors when ruling on a case (Hansford and Spriggs
2006). But any rational actor can see how a justice from a southern district of Illinois would
favor to rule for the death penalty in a highly publicized case or how a Democrat from Chicago
would rule in favor of gay marriage. If that person were to go against the ideology of the
district, it would only appear to stand that the action would hurt them once time for re-election
came around (Atkins 1972; Murphy 1964; Rohde and Spaeth 1976). . They may make
statements that align with the electoral district but do not necessarily correlate with what they
believe in (Gibson 2008). With that being said, the strategic theory has merit in several other
states around the U.S. It’s been able to show judges ruling as rational actors and weighing the
costs and benefits in ruling a certain way coming from a particular electoral district. Liberal
justices have shown a tendency to rule for the death penalty if they come from a conservative
district in certain states (Hall 1992). For these reasons the theory of strategy is what I believe
will be viewed in Illinois. The state is moving more and more toward a competitive election
cycle where political parties are playing a major role. A justice would need to vote strategically
in order to appease the party that is putting them up for nomination.
When looking at the three theories, all three could very easily explain a few
cases of the overall population of the cases analyzed. Every single model of thinking could be
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analyzed in the given setting of the Illinois Supreme Court. The hypothesis predicted is that the
Illinois Supreme Court justices will rule strategically in order to appease those who put them in
office.

RESEARCH METHODS

In order to measure partisan voting among the Illinois Supreme Court Justices, I
employed a bloc voting analysis technique. Several scholars such as Schubert (1958), Adamany
(1969), and Allen (1991) all utilized bloc voter analysis to identify any voter cleavages among
the particular court being studied. Each scholar looked to the opinions of a state Supreme Court
over a given time span and analyzed if any voting blocs became evident. They did so by
creating an index of cohesion (1958) in which they analyzed which justices voted with each
other on a consistent basis. Each study was completed in states that select their justices through
partisan elections, much like Illinois. In order to measure the Illinois Supreme Court over time,
I will analyze two different Illinois Supreme Courts that span roughly twenty years. By doing
so, I can argue that my results are not time-bound and do, in fact, represent the overall partisan
make-up of the Illinois Supreme Court.
Court 1 will cover the current Illinois Supreme Court and its decisions will be coded
from 2010-2014 in order to acquire an accurate sample. In total, these three years produced 242
cases. As previously stated, the current court has four Democrats and three Republicans. This
court was chosen for several reasons. It provides the most current and up-to-date opinions
offered by the Illinois Supreme Court. These years were selected because no changes or
alterations were made to the personnel that comprise the Illinois Supreme Court during this
time frame. That is, the same seven justices remained on the court during this time frame.
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Justices Thomas, Garman, and Karmeier are the Republicans on the court, while Justices
Burke, Kilbride, Theis, and Freeman make up the sitting Democrats. Only one Democrat does
not come from electoral district one, that being Chicago. The court also provides a fairly
accurate representation of the geographical ideologies of the state of Illinois as Chicago and the
counties surrounding it are major Democratic strongholds, while the remainder of the state
tends to lean Republican.
Court 2 will cover the time period from 1996 to 1998. During this time, 307 total court
opinions were coded and analyzed. This court was chosen because it represents a similar makeup to that of Court 1, with four Democrats and three Republicans. This enables me to measure
partisanship of different groups of individuals that tend to vote together. As in Court 1, three of
the four Democrats hail from electoral district one. In looking at both courts, only one
individual served on the bench throughout both time periods studied: Justice Charles Freeman
(D) from Chicago. The rest of the court from 1996 to 1998 was made up of Justice Michael
Bilandic (D), Justice James Heiple (R), Justice Moses Harrison II (D), Justice Mary McMorrow
(D), Justice John Nickels (R), and Justice Benjamin Miller (R). Featured on this court is the
first female justice on the Illinois Supreme Court in Justice McMorrow, as well as the first
African-American Illinois Supreme Court justice in Justice Freeman. The dynamics of Court 2
are intertwined with a lot of “firsts,” but on paper it still resembles Court 1 enough to measure
partisanship over time. The analysis has a total of 549 cases.
The coding of the cases during the given time periods was quite simple. Each case
analyzed was given a number. The seven justices aligned the top of the chart with their
corresponding decisions flowing downward. If the justice affirmed the decision of the court, a
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“1” was placed underneath his or her name corresponding to that respective case. If the judge
dissented, a “0” was placed underneath the name. Given the fact that on occasion a justice did
not take part in the decision, a “N/A” was placed under the name for that case so that his or her
decision to not participate did not misconstrue my statistical analysis. I did not throw out any
cases where a justice did not participate in the decision, the reason being that I wanted to
determine if any of the other justices who still did participate were voting along party lines. The
only thing that was omitted from the data was that particular justice’s name corresponding to
the N/A. I still coded and analyzed all cases; however, every justice may not have ruled in
every case analyzed. This process was then completed 549 times to make up the sample of the
Illinois Court for my research. Once this was completed, I created an index that paired justices
with respective justices who they affirmed and dissented with the most in order to try to
develop some sort of pattern. I looked at the data set that I created and analyzed who appeared
to be voting with whom. It was easy to determine if one set of justices continued to dissent with
each other, as there would be multiple “0’s” next to their names along with another justice. The
pattern became clear in simply looking at the cases that each justice either affirmed or
dissented.
With Illinois utilizing partisan elections to select its Supreme Court justices, I expect to
find the members of the court to vote strategically in order to appease the electoral districts they
come from. This should not be a widespread occurrence, though, as a majority of high courts
render unanimous decisions. This would suggest that precedent is the clear model of decision
making occurring in state Supreme Courts, but it is possible for minor occurrences of this
behavior to indicate other factors are causing influence, such as strategic behavior. If there are a
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significant amount of strategic decisions being made, it can affirm my hypothesis that the
partisan nature of elections is enacting a strategic approach taken by certain justices.
I focused much of my analysis on the cases that were not unanimous. This is not to say
that unanimous cases were not coded. The majority of the cases that rendered 7-0 decisions
were cases that came with clear and articulate precedent set forth by a previous court. The
opinions written by the justices cited previous decisions by other major courts to reflect how
the unanimous decision was agreed upon. The unanimous decisions were coded, but for this
particular study I am not searching for the cause behind unanimity. I am searching for the
driving force behind rulings that come with some form of dissent. It is no surprise that the
conservative response is to favor the business in such claims, whereas the liberal ideological
stance would side with the injured worker in any given case regarding workers compensations
claims. If two particular justices voted consistently together then I could attempt to determine
their voter allegiance. The goal was to formulate a sort of pattern that reflected which justices
voted along side which. If the court consistently rendered decisions where various voter blocs
of different parties became true, then one could assume the court acted in a non-partisan
fashion. Likewise, if a pattern were developed amongst partisan voting then it would be safe to
say that the court acts in a partisan fashion. The basic methodology revolves around dissents,
my data is limited in respect to determining the types of cases that are decided upon, and
however, it can produce voter cleavages, which have the potential to show certain partisan
affiliation among the Illinois Supreme Court.

DATA ANALYSIS

The data show that the overall make-up of the Illinois court acts in a non-partisan
fashion. Of the 242 cases analyzed for Court 1, only five of them rendered a perfect 4-3 split
decision with the majority making up the four Democrats. This translates to a mere 2.06% of
the coded cases that account for pure partisan divide. What also disproves my hypothesis is that
there were only 21 4-3-split decisions, making up just 8.68% of the total cases. This is because
oftentimes justices would cross partisan lines to join with other justices on the court. It is worth
noting that in the cases that resulted in a 4-3 Democrat-Republican split, both parties behaved
as expected in my coding schemes as described above. Four out of the five cases dealt with a
defendant challenging the sentence he or she was given in the court of law due to a technicality.
All three Republicans felt the court acted appropriately, and all dissented saying that the
sentence for that defendant should stay intact. The four Democrats, however, produced the
majority opinion of the court, reversing the initial court ruling and remanding for a new trial.
The partisan divide occurred due, in part, to a lack of precedent involved in this decision. The
opinion was not nearly as long and did not reference as many cases that could allude to how the
decision came about. I believe the partisan divide occurred partly due to the lack of precedent
and the justices briefly acting upon their ideology. The fifth case in the 4-3 split involved a
worker’s compensation case where, as expected, the Republicans favored the corporation,
which in this case was a local fire department. These cases represent perfect partisan cleavages
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being reflected in the Illinois Supreme Court. Unfortunately, because there are so few of them,
it is hard to back up the claim that the Illinois Supreme Court justices rule on partisan
affiliation.
Much like Court 1, Court 2 also produced insignificant levels of partisan divide. Out of
307 cases, a perfect Democrat-Republican split occurred in only two cases for a mere 0.65% of
the total sample for Court 2. However, the court did produce 43 4-3 split decisions for a total of
15.13% of the 307 case samples. Many of these cases saw one or two particular justices cross
party lines and join the majority of the opposite party. The strict partisanship is clearly not
evident in Court 2. In the two cases split along partisan lines, all seven justices behaved as their
ideology would indicate. Case 153, Bridgestone/Firestone v. Aldridge, presents a mass group of
employees seeking unemployment benefits while on strike. Due to different “acts of good
faith,” the four Democrats on the bench were able to overturn the appellate court ruling and
grant those employees unemployment benefits while on strike. The three Republicans disagreed
with the ruling, in dissent noting that due to the striking clause in the Illinois Unemployment
Act, the employees should be denied such benefits. Case 205 dealt with the broadening of the
authority of the Supreme Court when it comes to tax assessments. Because there had been no
previous statute set forth by the Illinois legislature, the Supreme Court ruled that their authority
over certain tax assessments were not in breach of separation of powers. Once again, all four
Democrats were unanimous in their ruling, with the three Republican justices on dissent. The
sheer fact that only two cases out of 307 produced strictly partisan results shows that the
Illinois Supreme Court has had nonpartisan leanings long before 2010.
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Just because my initial hypothesis of strict partisan divide did not pan out does not
mean that certain justices are not relying on policy preferences or acting strategically while on
the bench. Of the 242 cases in Court 1, 150 were unanimous, which makes up 61.98% of the
total number of cases. This means justices are dissenting in roughly 38% of cases. I focused on
the rate at which and with whom this occurred. Democratic Justices Kilbride, Burke, and
Freeman constituted the highest dissent rates. Kilbride dissented 31 times to make up 12.81%
of the total cases he took part in. Burke dissented 26 times, in 10.74% of the cases she took part
in, and Freeman dissented in 25 cases, or 10.33% of the total cases he took part in. The biggest
issue, however, is that they did not dissent in any particular fashion, often pulling with them a
Republican, indicating that partisan affiliation does not come into play.
The only true display of partisan unity among the Illinois Supreme Court comes in
looking at the voting records of Justices Burke and Freeman. When looking at Justice Burke’s
dissents, 84.61% of the time she and Justice Freeman dissented together. Freeman also
reflected a similar pattern in that out of all of his dissents, 88% of them were with Justice
Burke. With both hailing from electoral district one (Cook County), one could see how their
partisan attachment may pose some significance in their decisions with the desire to gain reelection.
In Justice Theis’ dissents she joined Justice Kilbride 50% of the time. While she only
dissented 16 times, in eight cases she joined Kilbride in that opinion. Kilbride, however, only
joined Theis 25.80% of the time, as he had 31 total, a larger number than Theis. This number is
not of any significance for the Republican justices. When any one Republican justice dissented,
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another Republican justice only joined in 14 times for 5.78% of the total cases. A majority of
dissents came from bipartisan groupings where Republicans and Democrats joined together.
The last piece of information to touch on deals directly with Justices Freeman and
Burke, as they seem to pose the greatest amount of partisan unity on the Illinois Supreme
Court. There were a total of 36 5-2 decisions made on the Illinois Supreme Court during the
years analyzed. This constituted 14.88% of all decisions made for the Illinois Supreme Court.
Of the 36 5-2 decisions, Freeman and Burke made up seventeen of those for 47.22%. This
means that Freeman and Burke were the lone dissenters in 7.02% of all cases in the study.
I wanted to look into this facet and uncover if the cases carried any partisan merit with
them. I have already been able to determine that the Illinois Supreme Court, as a whole, is nonpartisan, but it would be worth some scholastic value to uncover whether or not certain justices
played on their attitudes more than others.
Of the 17 cases in which Freeman and Burke were the lone dissenters, nine of those
dealt with some judicial matter in which the two felt the defendant was wrongfully convicted, a
policy preference that is consistent with the Democratic principle of being less harsh on crime
than the typical Republican. Four of the 17 cases dealt with workers’ compensation claims in
which the two ruled in favor of the worker against the given plaintiff, which in each case was a
corporation denying the benefits of the injured worker. In my opinion, it appears that Freeman
and Burke represent the most liberal ideology on the court. They may at times be able to drag
another Democrat with them in their dissents or affirmations, but overall their rulings reflect a
more liberal undertone than the rest of the court. The remaining four cases did not clearly
reflect any particular partisan preference that could be visibly coded. What my content analysis
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revealed is that the two justices in question appear to be the most liberal on the current Illinois
Supreme Court. They do, however, rule with a Republican justice on occasion. Although my
overall hypothesis of the Illinois Supreme Court does not carry as much merit as I would have
liked to see, I still was able to show that at least two Democratic justices appear to show their
partisan identity in certain cases. These cases dealt specifically with improper sentencing of
guilty persons and other mishaps handled by the initial circuit court.
Court 2 also presented me with several interesting points that further the overall notion
that the Illinois Supreme Court is non-partisan. A major difference I found between the two
courts was in analyzing a number of the unanimous decisions. Court 2 saw 157 unanimous
decisions for 51.64% compared to Court 1 at 61.98% unanimous rulings, which is a very
insignificant amount. However, this dissent saw no partisan attachment. For example, Justice
Harrison II had a dissent rate of 17.92% for Court 2. On Court 1, the highest-ranking member
in dissent was Justice Kilbride at 12.81%. The dissent rates across the board for Court 2 were
higher than that of Court 1 for all justices but one. Justice Freeman was the only justice in both
of my studies whose dissent rate actually rose over time. From 1996-98, Justice Freeman’s
dissent rate was the lowest of the court at 7.82%. During the 2010-14 analyses, he dissented on
10.33% of his total decisions. Overall, the increased dissent rate of Court 2 does not imply an
increase in partisanship. Different justices sided with the opposite party on many occasions. For
example, Justice Bilandic, a Democrat from Chicago, would dissent with Republicans more
often than not. His dissent rate with only Republican justices came out in 41.9% of all his
dissents. In 13 of his 31 dissents he went along with only Republicans, and not a single
Democrat joined the opinion. Bilandic was a long-standing justice from the city of Chicago.
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Former mayor of the Windy City, he was reported to have many conservative leanings while in
office. Bilandic, however, was not the only justice who appeared to go against his supposed
party lines from time to time.
Justice Nickels, a Republican on the Illinois Supreme Court during my 1996-98
analyses, would often side with the Democrats. In 17 of his 35 total dissents, Nickels was
aligned with only Democrats for a 48.5% total. Nickels appeared to be very nonpartisan.
Several articles at the time of his retirement boast about his care and devotion to improving
legal access to the lower class. In his own memoir he stated multiple times that he was not sure
what end of the political spectrum he fell under and even noted that during his time at Northern
Illinois University (where he received his bachelor’s degree) he had some liberal tendencies.
The Court 2 results show that no two justices voted alongside one another on a regular basis.
Obviously unanimous decisions do not count, but two justices never dissented together in an
overly outward fashion. The highest 5-2 pairing occurred with Justices Heiple and Miller, two
Republicans who accounted for five of the 47 5-2 decisions, or only 10.64% of the rulings. The
overall nature of Court 2 was highly dissenting, yet the dissents were rarely of partisan fashion.
Results from both studies are presented in Tables 1-4.
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Table 1: Court 1 “2010-2014” Overall Voting Amounts
Thomas-R
Majority
ruled
Percentage

Garman-R

224

KarmeierR
223

Theis-D

Burke-D

226

KilbrideD
206

218

212

FreemanD
215

92.56%

92.15%

93.39%

85.12%

90.08%

87.60%

88.84%

Dissent
against
majority
Percentage

13

17

16

31

16

26

25

5.37%

7.02%

6.61%

12.81%

6.61%

10.74%

10.33%

N/A

5

2

0

5

8

4

2

Percentage

2.07%

0.83%

0.00%

2.07%

3.31%

1.65%

0.83%

Table 2: Court 1 Decision Breakdown

Unanimous
6 to 1
5 to 2
4 to 3
3 to 4
2 to 1
1 to 6
0 Votes
Total

Number of
Times
150
35
36
21
0
0
0
0
242

Percentage
61.98%
14.46%
14.88%
8.68%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
100.00%

22
Table 3: Court 2 “1996-1998” Overall Voting Amounts

Majority
ruled
Percentage

HeipleR
261

NickelsR
270

Miller-R

Bilandic-D

Harrison
II-D

McmorrowD

FreemanD

268

264

248

267

283

85.02%

87.95%

87.30%

85.99%

80.78%

86.97%

92.18%

Dissent
against
majority
Percentage

41

35

37

31

55

37

24

13.36%

11.40%

12.05%

10.10%

17.92%

12.05%

7.82%

N/A

5

2

2

12

4

3

0

Percentage

1.63%

0.65%

0.65%

3.91%

1.30%

0.98%

0.00%

Table 4: Court 2 Case Decision Breakdown

Unanimous
6 to 1
5 to 2
4 to 3
3 to 4
2 to 1
1 to 6
0 Votes
Total

Number of Times
157
54
47
46
0
0
0
2
307

Percentage
51.64%
17.76%
15.46%
15.13%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.66%
100.00%

DISCUSSION

My overall goal was to test some sort of pattern in the rulings of the Illinois Supreme
Court Justices over the course of two decades. Given the nature of judicial elections in the state
of Illinois, I expected there to be a ideoligcal influence among the court in the form that the
justices would vote strategically to appease their constituencies. Unfortunately, the data show
there was not a clear underlying distinction between the Republicans and Democrats in the
Illinois Supreme Court over the past two decades. Yes, a majority of cases on the court were
unanimous; however, there were still roughly 40 to 50 percent of cases that carried some form
of a dissenting coalition. These cohesions of individuals were often constructed with bipartisan
support from different members of the Illinois Supreme Court. The nature of the court overall is
non-partisan. The theory of precedent is one that is explained the phenomenon that was the
Illinois Supreme Court. Each justice’s opinion would cite several different cases backing up
their opinions in order to show clear-cut precedent being taken into account when making such
rulings.
I was able to uncover a pair of justices who aligned with each other time and time again
in their rulings. Justice Freeman and Burke of Court 1, two Democrats from the city of
Chicago, appeared to be the most liberal justices on the Illinois Supreme Court between 20102014. When they were the lone dissenters, they constituted half of all 5-2 decisions. They may
be acting upon some attitudinal preference of theirs in accordance with their partisan affiliation,
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or feel the need to act strategically to appease the voters of Chicago. After all, Freeman and
Burke come from one of the most liberal districts in the state. If their voting patterns reflected a
conservative agenda, I wonder how the electorate would perceive that. Would they be
penalized, or would the voters even take notice?
For Court 2, it was interesting to note how two different justices actually dissented
against their party label in 40% of the cases. Justice Nickels and Bilandic would often join the
justices of the opposite party to dissent with no support from their own party upon the bench.
This shows me that during that era especially, ideological influences appear to have no effect
on decisions adjudicated in the Illinois Supreme Court and the justices were simply utilizing
their training and precedent in their decisions. Overall, my results reflect that the Illinois court
does not have a time-restraint on it, and multiple different courts over time have made decisions
free of ideological influence. Only in Court 1 were there brief dissents that appeared to have
some sort of ideological beliefs behind them. Majority of Americans pay very little attention to
the decisions made by their state’s Supreme Court. They do not follow the politics that
surround each and every decision; in fact, there is a large portion of Americans who cannot
even name the Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court (John G Roberts Jr.). The idea that they
will be able to identify the characteristics of their particular state court justice is far-fetched at
best.
What is alleviating these problems is the increased interaction of political parties in
these judicial elections. Political parties are providing the electorate with cheap heuristics in
order for them to be adequately informed when they go to the polls. Political parties run attack
ads, promote their candidate’s positions, which all can give adequate cues to any given voter on
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who to select for the Illinois high court. As political parties become more and more involved,
due to the increased awareness of the power of our court system, judges in partisan-elected
states will be forced to either rely more on their ideologies or vote strategically in order to
appease those who elected them to the bench. The reasoning behind this is that even though it
was a minor percentage, Court 1 had a tiny bit more partisan voting than Court 2. It will be
interesting to do this same study for Illinois in 20 years, when the courts have time to adjust to
the increasing political climate in judicial elections.
Looking back on the data itself, I would of liked to create a separate column that
analyzed the justice’s decisions approaching re-election terms. It would be of value to do some
sort of bloc style analysis in an attempt to develop voting patterns around this crucial element
of State Supreme Court justices. It would be important to note that with my given data set, it is
very difficult to understand the types of cases that the justices were voting for, or against. One
cannot look at my data and get an overall feel for which cases the Democrats and Republicans
on the court were voting towards. This hurt a bit of the conclusions gained from this research,
with that being said, one can still utilize these conclusions to note that the Illinois Supreme
Court is overall non-partisan and that its very possible that two of the current justices rely on
the partisan identity over others on the court.

FUTURE RESEARCH

The final research is not complete on the Illinois Supreme Court. In order to try and
identify more significant patterns, one could simply go back a bit farther, say to 1980, and do a
bloc style analysis to try and uncover any partisan undertones stemming from previous courts.
Although it appeared in my research that the further I went back, the less partisan the court
was, one may be able to uncover even more information on the partisan identity of the Illinois
Supreme Court. My research dealt primarily with the last 20 years, as the courts used presented
the exact same political affiliations and experienced no member changes during the two courts
analyzed. I would like to repeat this study in 20 years and see if the court becomes more
ideological as judicial elections attract more and more partisan influence. There is no doubt that
political parties have increasing interest in influencing the judicial system. If there is a seat to
be won with a party label on it, political leaders will do whatever it takes to win that
perspective seat. I would suspect that given the fact that two current justices on the Illinois
bench appear to be growing more ideological, we could see the court move in this direction
over time. Another factor that could be looked into is other state supreme courts. I wonder what
the voting tendencies of a state Supreme Court that utilizes nonpartisan elections or an
appointment process would reveal in terms of apparent voter blocs. It would be extremely
interesting to find voter blocs on a state that does not use partisan elections when my research
reveals Illinois has little partisan influence. Would certain judges vote alongside others
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consistently in a non-partisan electoral state? A cross-state comparison could reveal patterns in
the partisan influence given different electoral methods of other State Supreme Courts.
Whether or not one method promotes the most judicial independence would be vital in
deciphering how to elect justices going forward.
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